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In The History of Sexuality Michel Foucault argues that beneath a variety of 
sexual prohibitions of seventeenth-century European societies a “veritable 
discursive explosion” around sexuality could be discerned. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, sexual regulations had become ingrained in legislative 
discourse, and state intervention addressed numerous issues concerning sexual 
conduct, among them the legal age of marriage, the birth rate, fertility, and the 
frequency of sexual relations. Through its economic, legal, medical, and health 
policies, the modern state influenced the sexual conduct of its populations in 
new ways, resulting in dramatic demographic changes. By the nineteenth 
century, a broader discourse on sexuality was taking shape beneath the blanket 
of Victorian morality. It was nothing less than “an apparatus for producing an 
ever greater quantity of discourse about sex, capable of functioning and taking 
effect in its very economy.” Foucault‟s interpretation of course contradicted the 
common assumption of an absence of discussion of sexuality in the nineteenth 
century, followed by greater sexual freedom in the twentieth century. 
Considered alongside trends concerning gender and sexuality in post-
revolutionary Iran, Foucault’s portrait of sexuality in the Victorian era offers 
valuable insights into the contemporary situation in Iran. Foucault can shed 
light on the repercussions of the new sexual austerities that were imposed after 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In the 1980s the Islamist government instituted 
a dramatic reversal in human rights, especially regarding women’s rights. The 
state revived pre-modern social conventions (repudiation, veiling, flogging) but 
enforced them through modern means and institutions, which meant a wider 
application. In its system of distributive justice, Muslims and non-Muslims, 
men and women received different treatment before the law. Defunct and 
repressive Shi’i rituals of purity and penance were brought back, while 
polygamy and sex with underage girls were newly sanctioned. Openly gay men 
were severely punished, and a few were even executed. 
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However, the popular notion that Islamism has enforced an inclusive form of 
sexual repression on the Iranian people does not explain the complexity of what 
has taken place. There have been significant improvements in women’s 
education and health along with a remarkable drop in birth rates. How can such 
important reforms, which have many positive implications for women, coexist 
with harshly misogynistic laws and policies? Part of the answer is that before 
the revolution Iranian women had already made significant advances in these 
areas.  But the other part is that the policies of the Islamist government cannot 
easily be categorized as “puritanical” or “moralistic.” Rather, using Foucault’s 
framework, we can argue that various factions within the state actively deployed 
a new “sexual economy” for the population. Sometimes, the Islamist state 
privileged patriarchal interpretations of gender norms over more modern ones. 
At times, it adopted modern projects alongside a discourse that presented them 
as practices indigenous to traditional Islam. In all cases, the state used modern 
institutions to disseminate these various discourses. 
Studies of birth control and family planning in the United States provide us with 
yet another vantage point from which to examine the unintended results of 
family planning in Iran. As a result of industrialization, urbanization, and the 
adoption of contraceptive technologies, American society by the mid-twentieth 
century had experienced a profound change in its sexual mores. As people 
began to live longer and fertility rates dropped, marriage became more than an 
institution for procreation. Women‟s demands for emotional and sexual 
intimacy increased. The emphasis on romantic, (hetero)sexual love led to new 
forms of normative heterosexuality. Good sex in marriage became important, 
and romantic love seemed necessary to a good marriage. After Margaret Sanger 
and the Planned Parenthood Federation initiated the birth-control movement in 
the United States, many sectors of society gradually set aside their opposition 
and embraced such ideas. Most Protestant churches and Jewish organizations 
(and many individual Catholics) approved of contraception, hoping thereby to 
strengthen the bonds of marriage. Attitudes toward premarital sex also changed, 
with sex outside marriage becoming more acceptable. Widespread use of 
contraceptives helped make marriage a more companionate union. While this 
type of marriage involved a division of labor between breadwinner and 
homemaker, it was in some respects a more egalitarian and less patriarchal 
relationship than before. In addition, as Jennifer Bell points out, by separating 
sexual activity from procreation, “birth control proponents opened the door for 
non-reproductive relationships ranging from childless marriages to casual 
encounters to non-heterosexual relationships.” As women became more 
sexually assertive, they also became less tolerant of men‟s extramarital affairs, 
both heterosexual and homosexual. 
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By the 1960s and 1970s, the United States had moved further toward what 
could be called “individualistic marriages.” In this third phase in the evolution 
of Western marriage, romantic love retained its importance, but the partners had 
also to fulfill each others‟ psychological, and often occupational, needs. 
Occupational compatibility became a central aspect of psychological and 
emotional compatibility in an advanced capitalist order in which a majority of 
women not only had to but wanted to work. According to Stephanie Coontz, the 
author of Marriage, A History (2005), the increase in women's economic 
independence in the 1970s and 1980s initially led to rise in divorce rates, not 
because women's work and education created more bad marriages, but because 
they encouraged women to raise their expectations of fairness in marriage and 
gave them more resources to leave bad marriages. But as men and women 
adjusted to women's new bargaining power in and out of marriage, husbands 
and wives began to communicate better, spend more quality time together, and 
develop deeper friendships, leading to more satisfying marriages and sex lives 
for both partners. This helps explain why divorce rates have declined 
significantly for college-educated couples since the late 1980s (much more 
significantly than for less educated or lower-income couples). The right to 
divorce also led to lower rates of female suicide and domestic violence and 
contributed to more compatible unions among those who remained married. 
In the US, better heterosexual sex altered perceptions about other types of 
relationships.  Many came to believe that women had a right to enjoy sex, 
whether inside or outside marriage, whether in heterosexual or homosexual 
relationships, and neither should be covert any longer. A more vocal gay 
movement soon followed, one that fought against the hetero-normative social 
and legal institutions of American society and gained new rights for gays and 
lesbians. Although it suffered some setbacks during the early years of the AIDS 
epidemic in the 1980s, by the early twenty-first century, it was achieving 
numerous political victories. 
In Iran too, as the birth rate dropped, life expectancy increased, and changing 
gender norms saturated society through the international media, women‟s 
expectations of marriage shifted as well. Iranians had practiced arranged 
marriages for centuries, with less normative weight given to romantic love. 
During the Pahlavi era, companionate marriages gradually gained ground 
among the elite and the new urban middle classes. Nonetheless, parents still 
played a key role in introducing prospective couples, approving marriages, and 
negotiating dowry and mahriyeh. In the 1980s leftist and Islamist party leaders 
adopted parental roles and were expected to give their consent before a couple 
could marry. 
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By the first decade of the twenty-first century, in urban and even rural 
communities, arranged marriages and endogamous marriages (within kinship 
groups) have become less common. Although daughters still need their fathers‟ 
legal permission to marry in the Islamic Republic, at other levels the 
enforcement of Islamist strictures has slackened. Marriage is seen less and less 
as merely an institution for procreation, and women have come to expect 
intimacy and spontaneity along with a greater degree of emotional and sexual 
closeness.  Moreover, the mean age of marriage for girls has gone up, and 
dating has become a more acceptable part of life. In urban and northern rural 
communities, young men and women form friendships on the streets, at the 
universities, and in the workplace. This occurs even though the Islamist state 
has established many prohibitions against the mingling of unmarried men and 
women. After about a year of such semi-secret dating, a young man might go to 
the father‟s house and ask for his daughter‟s hand. Parents still help their sons 
and daughters with the cost of a new home and regard this as their 
responsibility. In part, this is because renting an ordinary two-bedroom 
apartment in better parts of Tehran, for example, required a huge down payment 
in 2007 Iran, plus a monthly rent of around $600. The idea of unmarried 
cohabitation has also gained limited social acceptance in the capital city, in spite 
of its nominal illegality. Romantic love in relationships and marriage is greatly 
valued and Valentine‟s Day has become a big day of celebration, much to the 
consternation of the government. 
In addition to covert homosexuality in many social sectors, especially religious 
seminars and same-sex high schools, within Tehran‟s educated and 
cosmopolitan population, a small, clandestine, gay subculture has also emerged, 
along with cyberspace publications in Persian which advocated a modern gay 
and lesbian lifestyle. Iran‟s gay and lesbian community desires legal recognition 
of homosexuality by the public and the state, as well as more egalitarianism 
within relationships. 
Meanwhile surging rates of unemployment and rising expectations concerning 
marriage have led to dramatic increases in the number of runaways, prostitutes, 
drug addicts, and suicides among young Iranian women. Many women 
complain of domestic violence and their husbands‟ extramarital affairs and want 
a way out. These upheavals have unleashed new anxieties about the changing 
sexual mores of the country.  This article explores the link between politics and 
the shifting gender roles in this third generation of Iranian youth since the 
revolution. 
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Women, the Politics of Reform, and the Discourse of Human Rights 
In the mid-1990s, the battles for a more tolerant Iranian society were fought in 
numerous and sometimes unlikely sites. Journalists, lawyers, ministers, doctors 
and nurses, fashion designers, actors and film directors, college students, 
literary writers, and homemakers became activists in the reform movement. 
Reformists came from many different social and religious orientations, 
including both secular and moderate Muslims. Some were leftist Islamists who 
had participated in the revolution, fought in the war, or had relatives who were 
martyred. Many contributed to literacy and health campaigns.  Such early 
supporters of the theocratic state, including women who had suffered the loss 
of loved ones in the war, were now increasingly dissatisfied with corrupt state 
policies and felt abandoned by it.  Most reformists had gone through a dramatic 
ideological transformation that was influenced further by the collapse of the 
Eastern European and Soviet systems. Veteran Islamists and opposition 
activists gradually reached a fragile truce in order to unite provisionally for a 
common cause. These organizations were reinforced by the increasing numbers 
of youth raised on satellite television and the Internet who resented the 
excesses of the theocratic state and its morality police. Reformists argued that 
opposition to the shah and Western domination had been only one dimension of 
the revolutionary agenda. Issues of more importance were the creation of a 
viable democracy and a new interpretation of Islam compatible with the 
requirements of modern life. 
The May 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as president strengthened 
the voices of women‟s rights advocates, who supported his run for office. 
He was reelected in June of 2001 with close to 76 percent of the vote, 
despite his limited success in carrying out his program in the face of 
resistance on the part of entrenched hard-liners. In 1999, more than seven 
thousand women ran as candidates for urban and provincial councils. In 
twenty cities these women candidates placed first in contests for council 
leadership positions, and in 58 cities they took second place. The February 
2000 elections brought a new generation of deputies to the Sixth Islamic 
Parliament (2000-2004), giving reformists a clear majority. Many deputies 
assumed they could simply reinstate greater social freedoms, changing the 
Islamist regime through legal, parliamentary means. Between 2000 and 
2004, the reformists who dominated the presidency, the Parliament and the 
provincial councils attempted to liberalize the system.  Women deputies 
organized a caucus and introduced a series of laws pertaining to the rights 
of women and girls, managing to pass a few of them. One reduced the 
severity of the hijab for children and high school students by allowing more 
colorful uniforms and scarves. The Parliament raised the legal age of 
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marriage for girls from nine to fifteen, but the all-powerful Guardian 
Council disagreed, and it was eventually set at thirteen. Single women 
received permission to study abroad on government scholarships. In the 
early 1990s women had gained limited rights to initiate divorce if their 
husbands were drug addicts, had a mental disorder or contagious disease, 
or had abandoned their families. Wives also gained limited child custody 
rights. The Reformists attempted to expand these rights further. 
President Khatami supported these efforts, including ones that would have 
equalized women‟s inheritance rights and given them greater divorce 
rights.  But the right to inheritance and several other bills were either 
rejected or severely revised by the Supreme Religious Leader, the Guardian 
Council, and the Expediency Council. The latter is a tribunal that arbitrates 
between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, usually siding with the 
latter. More ambitious projects, such as calls for the adoption of the UN 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), which the Khatami government had helped introduce, were 
ratified—with some reservations—by a parliamentary majority. 
Fierce opposition to the CEDAW developed in Qom, where Islamist men 
and women held demonstrations against the new law. Conservative clerics 
declared that joining CEDAW would amount to “a declaration of war 
against Islam.” Another accusation was that the CEDAW represented a 
perverted “Western sexual ethos and prostitution” that would result in the 
creation of unisex bathhouses. Eventually, the Guardian Council rejected 
the proposed law on the grounds that it conflicted with several principles of 
the constitution and Islam, including inheritance and divorce laws, the 
hijab, and polygamy. 
Despite strong public support and enthusiasm, the Khatami era did not 
succeed in overhauling the Islamist state, though it did provide greater 
opportunities for cultural expressions and political criticisms.  Moreover, 
the reformers faced repression at every step, since the police and the legal 
system remained under the control of the Guardian Council and the 
Supreme Religious Leader, as did military and foreign affairs. One result 
was that between 1997 and 2004, more than a hundred newspapers were 
closed down, and the state targeted political dissidents, journalists, and 
even some reform politicians. Many were arrested, murdered, or forced into 
exile, including a generation of student activists who held dramatic 
demonstrations in Iranian universities in 1999. 
When many disillusioned pro-reformists stayed away from the polls, 
conservatives were elected to control of the Seventh Islamic Parliament 
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(2004-2008). These conservatives halted the debate on the CEDAW and 
many other progressive gender reforms. Among them were large numbers 
of the Basij and Pasdaran, whose ascendancy to the top decision-making 
institutions marked a new stage in Iranian politics. Women deputies 
affiliated with the Basij, and with close ties to the rural sectors, promoted a 
few progressive measures, such as reinstituting abortion to save the life of a 
mother and the appointment of women judges in an advisory capacity. 
However, for the most part they supported the new conservative agenda. 
The reformists were further weakened when US President George W. Bush 
included Iran in his “Axis of Evil” in 2002 and suggested that the United 
States might invade Iran. The powerlessness of the reformists in the face of 
these foreign and domestic challenges led to widespread public 
disillusionment. Following a decade of reformist control in the provincial 
councils, the Parliament, and the presidency, the 2005 presidential 
elections brought to power Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a conservative populist 
and former member of Pasdaran. The presidency, the Parliament, and the 
provincial councils were now all in the hands of a new generation of 
conservatives who worked closely with the Pasdaran. Every year, Iran 
inched closer to becoming a militarized state. 
The decision of nearly twenty million disillusioned pro-reformist voters to 
boycott the elections, a certain degree of voting fraud engineered by the office 
of the Supreme Religious Leader, and the zeal with which the Basij got out the 
vote all helped bring Ahmadinejad to power. Various reports estimate that by 
2005 there were around eight million “card-carrying” Basijis: three million 
active members (trained at military camps and used in domestic repression) and 
five million inactive members (individuals who receive handouts and can be 
mobilized at election times). Those who voted for Ahmadinejad did so out of 
Basiji loyalty and support for his economic agenda. They were moved by his 
piety, his promises of social justice, and his opposition to the pro-market 
economic liberalization proposals of his rival, Hashemi Rafsanjani, plans which 
would have ended many government subsidies. 
Ahmadinejad‟s election also expressed a backlash against the sexual revolution 
taking place in Iran. I was in Tehran just before the election and was amazed by 
the range of negative comments on the streets and in social gatherings about 
women‟s supposed scandalous behavior. Many men, including young working 
class men bitterly opposed to the government, nonetheless expressed outrage 
over young women‟s presumed sexual promiscuity and at the sight of girls and 
boys walking in the streets with clasped hands. In such conversations, public 
criticisms of the economy were almost always tied into stories of young women 
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selling their bodies to Arab Sheikhs (and not Iranian clients) in the Persian Gulf 
to raise money for their dowries and support their families. As journalist 
Christopher de Bellaigue reported at the time, many of Ahmadinejad‟s 
supporters were deeply concerned with the “dramatic rise in prostitution, 
marital infidelities, and drug addiction,” which they blamed on reformist social 
and cultural policies. They remembered that, as mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad 
had arranged low-interest loans for newly married couples, thus encouraging the 
institution of marriage. As a presidential candidate, he promised not only to 
reduce the staggering unemployment rate but also to provide more generous 
financial support for young couples. 
Supporters of Ahmadinejad tapped into these feelings by distributing a 
documentary film by director Massoud Dehnamaki (a former Basiji) entitled 
Prostitution and Poverty (2002) before the elections. The film, a brilliant piece 
of propaganda worthy of Karl Rove in George W. Bush‟s administration, was 
aimed at Ahmadinejad‟s poor urban and rural supporters.  It featured a series of 
interviews with poor urban women who had entered the sex trade in the Persian 
Gulf, often for a limited period. Some saved up to help desperate family 
members or to raise a respectable jahiziyeh to get married. This clever 
manipulation of social and cultural grievances, which played also on Iranian 
prejudices against Arabs, contributed to the defeat of the reform movement. 
Between 2005 and 2008, Ahmadinejad ratcheted up the nuclear confrontation 
with the West, and clamped down on Reformists, advocates of women‟s rights, 
labor activists, and other progressive social sectors. Yet it became clearer than 
ever that no amount of moral exhortation, foreign provocation, or fiscal reforms 
could take Iranian society back to the early days of the revolution, when young 
people followed the dictates of the Islamist state on gender and morality issues, 
many of them willingly. 
 
The Politics of Birth Control 
The dramatic change in gender relations in Iran can be traced to some of the 
unintended consequences of the nation‟s family planning program, which in 
turn altered people‟s expectations of marriage. Soon after taking power in 1979 
the state instituted its own religious sex education, which served a different 
function. Rather than censoring all discussion of sex, the state initially took a 
more traditionalist stance, banning only progressive treatments of sex 
influenced by Western discourses. The religious manuals of the clerics, with 
their detailed instructions on proper sexual conduct and on the rituals and 
purification required after sex, became mandatory reading in school. During 
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religious instruction in public schools, teachers spent a great deal of time 
describing proper procedures for ablution of the genitals and restoration of 
taharat (ritual cleansing). Instructors provided students with information about 
the anatomical and biological differences between men and women 
(menstruation, ejaculation, childbirth, etc.) from a religious perspective. Ziba 
Mir Hosseini points out that similar information was disseminated in 
neighborhood mosques and prayer sessions. Discussions of issues such as 
masturbation (viewed as reprehensible), vaginal discharge, and nocturnal 
discharge focused on avoiding ritual pollution before prayer. In these manuals, 
shahvat (sexual desire) and interest in jama‟ (intercourse) were seen as much 
stronger in women than in men. But women‟s haya (modesty) and men‟s 
gheyrat (honor) controlled excessive female desire. A high school teacher from 
Qom recalled that children constantly asked for definitions and explanations of 
words like sodomy, bestiality, and a variety of other forms of sexual conduct 
they encountered in these religious manuals of sexual etiquette, demands that 
placed their parents and teachers in an awkward position. 
Additionally, the new regime adopted natalist policies. Couples with seven or 
more children received a plot of land on which to build a home. The state 
limited access to birth control and banned abortions, which had been permitted 
during the first trimester in the Pahlavi era. Families who sent their sons to the 
war were compensated with food coupons, monetary rewards, and expanded 
educational opportunities. Overall, total fertility rates increased from 6.3 in 
1976 to 7.0 in 1986, as Iran‟s population expanded dramatically from 34 million 
to 49 million. 
When the war ended in 1988, the government faced a population explosion and 
a disastrous economy. Supported in this by Ayatollah Khomeini, the state began 
to encourage family planning. Modern approaches to reproductive health were 
integrated into religious teachings and implemented as part of state health 
policy. Birth control was reauthorized in 1989. The state also requested 
assistance from the UN Fund for Population Activities. The architects of the 
new birth-control program were Hussein Malikafzali and his colleagues 
Habibollah Zanjani and Muhammad Alizadeh. Each had held positions in the 
Ministry of Health since the Pahlavi era.  Their goals were to encourage birth 
spacing of three to four years, to discourage early and late pregnancy, and to 
limit family size to first to three and later to two children. The team 
reintroduced some of the birth-control policies of the pre-revolutionary National 
Organization of Women that had been shelved, and added many new features. 
This time, they had more success then under the shah‟s regime. 
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By the end of the twentieth century, Iran had become a model for other 
developing nations in the area of population control.  Before the revolution, the 
annual rate of population growth had dropped from 3.1 percent in 1966 to 2.7 
percent in 1976. This trend had reversed itself after the revolution, so that by 
1986, the annual rate of population growth was 3.9. In the next decade (1986-
1996), the annual rate dropped once again, this time more dramatically, to 2.0 
percent. Total fertility rates also dropped to 2.1, making Iranian rates 
comparable to those of South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.  Between 1986 
and 1996 the there was a 50 percent drop in the number of women who married 
before the age of twenty, even though the state encouraged early marriage.  The 
average age of women at first marriage increased from 19.7 in 1976 to over 22 
in 1996, with the gap between rural and urban women at first marriage almost 
disappearing. Meanwhile 74 percent of the women of childbearing age were 
using contraceptives. 
A subsequent study showed that the increase in a husband and wife‟s level of 
education in the same period had led to the success of the program. After a 
decade of revolution and war, families seemed to place greater value on having 
daughters than before. Fathers and brothers now welcomed financial assistance 
to parents by daughters. The number of unmarried women who financially 
support their parents rapidly increased. This process improved relations between 
fathers and daughters and reduced the financial burden on brothers, who were 
the major source of support for older parents.  As a result, sisters felt they were 
entitled to a larger share of their father‟s estate and many went to court to 
challenge their brothers over inheritance rights. 
An international study similarly suggested that men's attitudes towards women 
had changed. In a comparative study of Iran, Jordan, and Egypt, Mansoor 
Moaddel and Taghi Azadarmaki found that 76 percent of Iranians agreed that 
two or less was the ideal number of children in a family, 40 percent felt that a 
woman‟s employment did not interfere with her intimacy with her children, and 
only 45 percent felt that a woman needed to have children to feel satisfied. All 
of these numbers were substantially lower than those in Egypt and Jordan. 
Iran's birth-control campaign showed that the state was willing to articulate a 
more liberal discourse on sexuality when it suited its purposes, in this case, 
population control. Even so, child marriage, violence against women, 
repudiation, polygamy, lack of community property, and unequal inheritance 
rights persisted. On the latter issues, the regime followed a patriarchal and often 
misogynistic reading of Islam, and refused to adopt a more liberal and tolerant 
interpretation that would have empowered women in their personal lives. 
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Women‟s empowerment was hardly the goal of the Islamist state. Moreover, 
whenever birth control came in conflict with men‟s access to sexual pleasure, 
the state refused to support the former. For the purposes of population control 
and women‟s health, doctors in the Ministry of Health recommended that 
women not have children until after the age of twenty.  But the state continued 
to keep the legal age of marriage low in order to serve men's sexual interests. 
Finally, during the reformist Sixth Parliament, the state agreed to raise the legal 
marriage age from nine to thirteen. Nonetheless, there was still a ten-year 
discrepancy between the legal age of marriage and the mean age of marriage. 
Likewise, temporary marriage and polygamy remained legal, though both 
practices contributed to prostitution and venereal disease. The state continued to 
follow a dichotomous policy, on the one hand intervening in the sexual conduct 
of citizens to encourage smaller families and to assure men‟s easy access to sex, 
and on the other denying women greater control in other areas of their lives. 
This was the secret of the Islamist state‟s sexual economy. 
By 2005 the government of the Islamic Republic had woken up to the 
unintended results of its family planning. But the genie was out of the bottle; 
women had become aware of benefits of low fertility and could not be 
persuaded to return to old practices. Moreover Iran‟s high unemployment rates 
did not permit a return to such policies. Once in office, Ahmadinejad did try to 
reverse the fertility trend and revive the pronatalist trends concomitant with 
Khomeini‟s jihadist policies of the early 1980s, even though Khomeini had 
supported population control by the time of his death in 1989. Ahmadinejad 
declared that a stronger Iran, with a nuclear capability, needed to be more 
populous and recommended more part-time rather than full-time employment 
for women. Even before he assumed power, the state attempted to restrict 
abortions. However, the president‟s comments alarmed the public and even 
many in the government, who saw them as yet another sign of his bellicose 
foreign and domestic politics. 
 
Sexual Awakening: Rural and Town Marriages and the Dilemma of 
Unmarried Girls 
Companionate, monogamous marriages, in which young adults have a strong 
voice in choosing a spouse, had become the accepted norm among the educated 
new middle classes by the 1970s. But in poorer rural communities, parents 
continued to arrange their children‟s marriages, and girls were married at a very 
young age, often around puberty or before. With the nearly universal adoption 
of birth control among married couples, better health and sex education in the 
1990s, and expanding access to a broader range of media, marriage practices 
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evolved in rural communities as well. By 2000, people in poor rural 
communities of southwest Iran no longer viewed marriage as only an institution 
for procreation. Young people looked for psychological and social compa-
tibility, mutual intimacy, and affection, and insisted on choosing their partners. 
Despite continued resistance by more conservative sectors of society, birth 
control and sex education classes became mandatory for prospective couples 
after 1993. Participants received contraceptives and advice on intimate sexual 
matters. Offered in about 5,000 health centers, these classes lasted over an hour, 
with separate sessions for men and women. Class content varied somewhat 
according to the cultural diversity of the nation, from the more liberal northern 
province of Gilan to the much more conservative southeastern province of 
Sistan-Baluchistan. Generally, participants watched a film, explaining the 
body's erogenous zones, the sexual needs of men and women, and the ways of 
stimulating one‟s partner. The emphasis seemed to be on male sexual 
gratification and ways in which wives should keep their husbands satisfied and 
content. Female sexuality was discussed. Many women were surprised by what 
they learned in this class. Shohreh, a 20-year-old sociology student, who 
attended the classes before marrying her fiancé, declared 
I feel ashamed . . . that I‟m twenty years old but I still know nothing 
about sex. I ask myself why I‟ve never read any books about it. Before I 
watched this film, I thought that an orgasm was something only men 
had. I didn‟t know that women could have such a feeling. 
Many couples returned for individual counseling after marriage. This meant that 
young couples no longer had to exclusively rely on in-laws to resolve marital 
conflicts and had access to other sources of authority. 
In an effort to reduce sexual and psychological trauma for young women who 
might be virgins until their wedding, doctors now advised a couple to wait until 
both were mentally and physically prepared and reminded them of the 
importance and impact of the first sexual encounter, especially on women. As 
Dr. Aminian points out, 
If, for example, a couple is suffering from stress, or is physically tired, 
or one of the partners really doesn‟t feel like having sex, then they 
shouldn‟t force it just because it is the wedding night.... We even tell the 
couples that it can take two or three weeks before the time is right to 
have sex for the first time. 
The young couple is also advised to delay pregnancy until they have adjusted to 
their new life. 
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Other shifts in social and economic trends contributed to these dramatic changes 
in gender relations and sexual mores. The basic family structure now 
incorporates not only the extended (traditional), but also the neolocal 
(established at marriage) unit. As parental authority has substantially weakened 
in Tehran and other urban communities, a decline in arranged marriages and an 
increase in “marriages based on free choice” has been observed. Marriages 
within kinship groups have also decreased. Slightly more than 20 percent of 
couples are first cousins, and around the same number are distant relatives. The 
lowest numbers of kin marriages were found in culturally liberal northern 
province of Gilan, and the highest in the culturally conservative southeastern 
province of Sistan-Baluchistan, where the mean age of women at first marriage 
is sixteen. 
Despite significant changes in the 1990s, great differences have continued to 
exist between urban and rural communities, and between different regions.  In 
increasingly urbanized northern villages, and those around Shiraz and Isfahan, 
educated girls, including doctors and dentists who earned substantial incomes, 
have became desirable marriage partners. High school teachers are even more 
sought after because their summers off give them more free time in which to 
raise a family. Young women‟s expectations in marriage have also changed. 
Anthropologist Erika Friedl writes that their ideal husband is a man who is 
“good to talk to, pleasant to look at, reasonable and good-tempered, [had] a 
good income, and [helped] with housework.” Marriage ceremonies and the 
requisite gifts had also become more extravagant. A woman‟s family regarded 
an expensive wedding ceremony and a large mahriyeh as the best forms of 
insurance against repudiation. 
In villages surrounding Shiraz, young boys might decide whom they wanted to 
marry, and girls might refuse the husband their parents had chosen for them. 
Anthropologist Mary Hegland reports: 
As a newly married couple moves to its own home, the older generation 
loses influence over their lives. Brides and daughters-in-law no longer 
have to work under the direction of their mothers-in-law and defer to 
their wishes. Brides run their own homes and kitchens, and do not want 
their mothers-in-law to tell them what to do. Twenty-five years ago, 
married couples barely spoke to each other in public.... Now married 
couples can be openly affectionate physically with each other in front of 
others.... Engaged couples go visiting together to the homes of relatives. 
They even go into Shiraz together. They visit in each other‟s homes, and 
may even stay overnight. 
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Thus, a gradual process of individuation was taking place in rural communities 
as well. At the same time, the increase in the age of marriage for women and the 
reduced popularity of arranged marriages and kinship marriages had led to the 
appearance of an unprecedented social category, “the unmarried female 
teenager who lives at home.” Friedl writes that in villages and small urban 
communities this phenomenon was so new that 
no culturally and socially acceptable and meaningful way of living has 
yet developed for these young women. While their teenage brothers 
have the run of their village or town, the young women cannot go out 
unchaperoned without risking their reputation; they have no income 
and are therefore entirely dependent on the generosity of their father 
and brothers; they have little to do at home because housework is 
shared among all female family members; their social circle is 
extremely limited; and outside work is not to be had. Most of them 
simply sit, bored, in front of the television. They “sit at home waiting 
for a good suitor,” people say. And as the days of early, arranged 
marriages are over in most families, this “waiting for a suitor” is more 
dependent on chance than ever before. 
In more culturally conservative parts of the country, such as the southwestern 
province of Sistan-Baluchistan, the southern province of Khuzistan, the western 
province of Kurdistan, the northeastern province of Khorasan, or the central 
province of Yazd, where arranged marriages were still the norm, girls with 
college or even high school diplomas were threatening to some men and their 
families. As sociologist Mitra Shavarini reports, here young women found out 
that “their higher education, which they hoped would improve their marriage 
prospects, now „overqualifies‟ them with most Iranian men.” From an early 
sample of more than 500 women in Yazd who had married and given birth 
before the age of fifteen, Soraya Tremayne concludes that girls who left school 
after the primary level married more easily and gained status by virtue of their 
marriage and children. Those who enrolled in university and moved away from 
home might find partners at the university. The problem, Tremayne reports, 
resided with the large middle group of girls who stayed in their villages, 
continued into secondary school, but neither attended college nor found 
employment. These young women missed out on both jobs and husbands, and 
were subject to much stricter paternal control. Their recreation seemed limited 
to intrafamilial activities, such as going out for pizza, watching television, 
visiting the extended family, or occasionally going on pilgrimage with them. 
These young women were not ignorant of sexual matters, however. Religious 
teachers at school and on local television stations lectured on Shi‟i regulations 
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of sexuality. Bazaars and itinerant vendors openly sold condoms alongside 
candy and cigarettes. Satellite television, present in a significant number of 
urban and rural homes, provided Western representations of sexuality in popular 
programs ranging from Baywatch and Sex in the City to more sober and 
educational ones, such as the Oprah Winfrey Show, where sex and sexuality 
were common themes. 
Ahmadinejad knew well that such households comprised his political base. 
Rather than expanding employment for women, Ahmadinejad‟s central policy 
with regard to the family was facilitating marriage through various loans and 
subsidies, advocating pronatalist policies, and promoting part-time employment. 
In 2007, Tehran's mayor Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf complained that he could 
not continue the marriage-loan program, which his predecessor Ahmadinejad 
had instituted as mayor, because it would bankrupt the city‟s treasury. At the 
same time, Ahmadinejad viewed marriage loans as integral to his campaign 
strategy and battled with the Seventh Parliament to institute similar loans for the 
whole nation. In 2006 he required the sum of 1.3 billion dollars to provide cash 
subsidies for marriage and rent to low-income families, and established the 
Imam Reza Love Fund (Sandoq-i Mehr-i Imam Reza) for this purpose. When 
the Parliament refused to approve the fund, Ahmadinejad created an alternative 
venue, including conservative NGOs, that were not responsible to the 
Parliament and could distribute the funds independently. This provoked a major 
conflict between the president and the Parliament that spilled into other areas. 
The marriage crisis, coupled with high unemployment rates and a series of other 
social problems, could not be resolved with stopgap measures. Still, these 
measures were meant to enhance Ahmadinejad‟s populist credentials. 
 
A Radical Discourse on Gay/Lesbian Rights 
The new discourse on sexuality has not been limited to heterosexual relations, 
dating practices, or traditional marriage issues. In addition, it has cautiously 
touched upon the nation‟s small gay subculture. The Iranian Queer Organization 
(formerly known as the Persian Gay and Lesbian Organization or PGLO) was 
founded in 2004.  Its headquarters are in Toronto, Canada, but the group has 
many branches in Europe and the US, as well as an underground office in Iran. 
In December 2004, MAHA: The First Iranian GLBT e-Magazine began 
publication from an anonymous site inside the country, with the support of 
diaspora GLBT activists in England. Like other journals of its kind, MAHA 
interviewed international gay activists, published articles and letters about the 
experience of being closeted, addressed the trauma of hiding one‟s sexuality in 
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both the family and the workplace, and celebrated coming out and rejoicing in 
one‟s sexuality. Additionally, it contained advice columns responding to 
readers‟ concerns about sexual problems, including HIV/AIDS. 
The journal included glossy, provocative photographs, though it avoided 
illustrations with frontal nudity. It had regular features on the history of 
homosexuality. Articles about Oscar Wilde, Sigmund Freud, and Alfred Kinsey, 
as well as essays on sexuality under Stalinism and Nazism, appeared alongside 
discussions of homosexuality in Iranian history, including brief biographies of 
prominent artists such as Sadeq Hedayat and Fereydoun Farrokhzad. 
Efforts to redefine homosexuality and encourage a more modern gay culture 
extend to the domain of language itself. Instead of the term hamjens baz 
(roughly translated as "faggot") the journal used the more respectable term 
hamjens gara (homosexual orientation). 
What made the journal such a groundbreaking publication is its discussion of 
homosexual relations within contemporary Iranian society and of the many 
ways in which closeted homosexuality also affects heterosexual marriage. 
MAHA was fearless in challenging the state‟s prohibition against 
homosexuality, writing, for example, that many religious texts recognize the 
right of a man to have sex with a little girl, but not the right to consensual 
homosexual relations among consenting adults: “We belong to a society where 
pedophilia is legal and justified according to the shari‟a, yet a free and 
voluntary sexual relationship, between two homosexual adults, is considered a 
crime.” 
Like many advocates of women‟s rights, MAHA was critical of the new 
religious thinkers for their silence concerning sexuality and gender. Religious 
reformers such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar, who speak of 
“Protestantization of Islam,” close their eyes to the sexual concerns of the 
nation: 
Thousands upon thousands (if not millions) of Muslim homosexuals, 
who attend mosques, including homosexual clerics, cannot be forgotten. 
The truth is that these individuals form a significant social, cultural, 
and religious foundation out of which the [reformist] religious thinkers 
have emerged. The silence of the theoreticians of Islamic 
Protestantization about the social and cultural rights of homosexuals, 
especially Muslim homosexuals, is the missing link in the discourse of 
our religious thinkers. 
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MAHA proposed a more tolerant reading of the Qur‟an. Pressing a believer into 
choosing between his “religious and conscientious beliefs” and his “sexual and 
inner inclinations,” is akin to condemning him/her to a life of hell. It is not man 
but God who should render this type of judgment in the afterlife. If Islam is a 
religion of equality, then believers should not be divided on the basis of their 
sexual orientation, “where homosexual believers become „second class citizens‟ 
and non-homosexuals ones are deemed closer to God. No one can claim to own 
God and the Qur‟an, and no one can be forced out of a religion.” 
Critically appropriating the Aristotelian-Islamic definition of rational happiness, 
which calls for moderation as a prerequisite to contentment, MAHA argued for a 
“rational moderation” between one‟s religious beliefs and sexual desires, 
without clerical mediation between God and Human beings.  Every person 
should be the judge of his/her ethical conduct. Since homosexuals of “the two 
other Abrahamic religions [Judaism and Christianity] have reached a consensus 
between their religious beliefs and their sexual inclinations,” Muslims should be 
able to do the same and continue “the path laid out by Jewish and Christian 
religious thinkers. This new reading of the Qur‟an, MAHA advised, ought to 
begin with a reinterpretation of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. “The story 
of the people of Lot suggests that homosexuality has been part of human society 
from its beginning and, contrary to what orthodox clerics claim, is not an 
imported Western product” Also, in the Qur‟anic or Biblical accounts “there is 
no single reference to female homosexuality. So why is female homosexuality 
(mosaheqeh) not free and recognized in Muslim societies?” 
MAHA criticizes secular Iranian intellectuals and artists who dare not speak out 
in defense of homosexuality: “If an artist or anyone else is sent to jail for the 
„crime‟ of homosexuality, would Iranian artists and leftists speak out in his/her 
defense? We can definitely say no! This is the legacy of Islam and Stalinism! 
Though we must admit that in Europe, too, homosexuality is still viewed as 
only a tolerable „perversion.‟” 
Many clerics (including Ayatollah Khomeini) have approved of sex-change 
operations, reasoning that surgery would end gender ambiguity. Muhammad 
Mehdi Kariminia, a university professor and cleric in Qom, who wrote his 
doctoral thesis on Iranian transsexuals, illustrates the mindset of those who 
encourage such operations.  He believes that “transsexuals are sick because they 
are not happy with their sexuality and so should be treated” through operations, 
while “homosexuality is considered a deviant act” and punishable by law. These 
operations are often unsuccessful in resolving a person‟s sexual ambiguity and 
might lead to depression and suicide. However, the state‟s recognition of 
transsexuality as a medical condition that can be “cured,” has created new 
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spaces for living a transgendered life.  Gay men and lesbians who pass as 
transsexuals receive a medical certificate that protects them from legal 
persecution. Many go through such ruses, claiming that they are waiting for an 
operation at some unforeseeable future. 
The rigid gender division between “active” and “passive” partners is not limited 
to gay men, but also defines many lesbian relations in Iran. A lesbian columnist 
who writes under the pen name Delaram complains, 
Unfortunately in our country, and among lesbians, a situation has 
developed where they avoid calling themselves passive (maf „ul) or even 
versatile. This is a term of ill repute for them. They even argue among 
themselves about who is more active (fa‟el). Each tries to speak with a 
lower voice, or act as a luti [physically strong, even gangsterish male 
homosexual] and adopt such mannerisms. . . . Many refuse to perform 
so-called feminine chores. For example, they never want to cook. It is 
as if they view themselves as distinct from women. . . . But how could 
you be a homosexual and not be a feminist? How could you want a 
woman as your partner, but not demand equal rights for yourself and 
for your partner? 
According to MAHA, compulsory heterosexuality is a significant problem in 
contemporary Iranian society, since family members continue to view 
homosexuality as a transitional stage to adult heterosexuality and therefore 
pressure homosexual relatives to marry a member of the opposite sex. In 
addition, the state, the media, and the society as a whole, place a great deal of 
pressure on unmarried people to wed. Many parents also blame the mandatory 
sex-segregated policies of the state for their children's homosexuality, and 
pressure them to seek medical advice. Doctors adopt various approaches with 
homosexual clients. They prescribe antidepressants and spend most of the 
therapy sessions (often paid for by the parents) discussing other issues in the 
lives of their clients. More enlightened doctors tell their clients that nothing can 
be done to “cure” their homosexuality. A significant number of homosexuals 
end up marrying, hoping to shed their sexual inclinations, or just to have a 
family. A modern solution (which replicates some premodern patterns of 
sexuality) is an arranged marriage between a lesbian and a gay person. The 
couple would have a “perfunctory marriage and look like a husband and wife,” 
but in reality each would pursue his/her own lifestyle. 
A much older practice is to arrange the marriage of one‟s same-sex beloved 
with a sister or cousin. For example, a young man might arrange the marriage of 
his sister to his male lover. He would then marry another woman himself. In 
this way, the two male lovers (who are now both married) become brothers-in-
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law and would be able continue the relationship under the guise of family 
connections. MAHA rejected the idea of marrying an unsuspecting partner and 
suggests that such marriages exploit other people: 
Do we really solve our pains and problems as gays and lesbians by 
getting married? Have we not sacrificed another human being, along 
with ourselves, in this marriage? Doesn‟t the person we marry have 
hopes, wishes, and dreams as we do? Does s/he not need an honest 
(and not forced) love and affection? Have we been honest with the 
person we are marrying for a lifetime? Why should we selfishly 
sentence such a person and ourselves to a life of misery without love 
and honesty? 
The desire to have children is important, but does not justify marrying an 
unsuspecting heterosexual partner: 
Yes, some homosexuals want to have children. However, we cannot 
ethically or responsibly use marriage with a non-homosexual to reach 
our goal. More than anything else, marriage should be based on love, 
attraction, and affection, the desire for the union of two people, not the 
desire to have children. 
MAHA claimed that among various NGOs and dissident political groups, there 
is greater tolerance for modern gay rights. In the 2005 presidential elections, 
several (unsuccessful) candidates, such as Mostafa Moin, included the slogan 
“respect for different lifestyles,” a euphemism for gay and lesbian rights, in 
their political platforms. But MAHA, which was distributed electronically in 
portable document format (.pdf) and managed to elude the Islamic Republic's 
censorship laws for two years, finally folded in 2006 under fear of arrest and 
execution of its contributors. Through its courageous reporting, MAHA showed 
that the demands of the Iranian gay/lesbian community are very similar to those 
of women in heterosexual communities; these include more companionate 
unions and the right to live in dignity and respect outside the matrimonial unit. 
Other publications such as Cheraq and the Iranian Queer Organization 
(formerly PGLO), led by Arsham Parsi in Canada, continue this work from 
diaspora with covert input from Iran‟s queer community. 
State Persecution of Sexual Transgression 
Discussions surrounding marriage, fidelity, and sexual orientation continued, 
even in a persistent atmosphere of fear and intimidation, when the regime's 
persecution of openly gay men and transgressive heterosexual women increased 
after 2005. Mindful of its international image and reputation, the state 
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sometimes replaced the stoning of women with public executions. In August 
2004, Atefeh Rajabi, a feisty sixteen-year-old, was hanged from a crane in the 
main public square of the town of Neka for no greater crime than having had 
sex with a man to whom she was not married. By contrast, her male partner's 
crime did not merit the death penalty in the eyes of the law. This discrepancy is 
based on the notion that a woman's sexual transgression is a much bigger 
offense than a man's. Neka was also the city where several government officials 
and security forces were arrested a few months later for setting up brothels and 
organizing child prostitution rings. 
The war against homosexuality and an openly gay lifestyle escalated almost 
immediately after the Basiji Ahmadinejad was elected to the presidency. In July 
2005, the world was horrified by the torture and execution of two teenage boys 
in Mashhad, Ayaz Marhoni, 18, and Mahmoud Asgari, who was either 16 or 17 
according to press reports. The authorities initially accused them of sodomy 
[lavat] but later charged them with rape of a younger boy. However, as Doug 
Ireland reported, three independent gay sources inside Iran confirmed that “the 
teens were well-known in the city‟s underground gay community as lovers who 
lived together, and the rape charge was fabricated.” This was followed by the 
torture and execution of several other men charged with pedophilia and various 
sexual transgressions, whose sole “crime” was consensual sex. 
Under Ahmadinejad, the state gave additional responsibilities to the Basijis, 
who began to function as agent provocateurs. Undercover Basiji agents 
entrapped gay men through ads in Internet chat rooms. Once the unsuspecting 
young men arrived at the designated meeting place, they were apprehended by 
the Basijis and tortured. Meanwhile, in the same culturally conservative 
provinces where girls lived under harsh patriarchal fathers, male homosexuals 
risked death at the hands of the security forces, or even members of their own 
families, who justified the murder of a "deviant" relative as a matter of honor. 
While the shari‟a requires either the actual confession of the accused or four 
witnesses who observed them in flagrante delicto, today‟s authorities look only 
for medical evidence of penetration in homosexual relationships. Upon finding 
such evidence, they pronounce the death sentence. Because execution of men on 
charges of homosexuality has prompted international outrage, the state has 
tended to compound these charges with others, such as rape and pedophilia. 
Continual use of these tactics has undermined the status of Iran's gay com-
munity and attenuated public sympathy for them. Meanwhile, many Iranians 
believe that pedophilia is rampant in the religious cities of Qom and Mashhad, 
including in the seminaries, where temporary marriage and prostitution are also 
pervasive practices. 
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Iranian society is in the midst of major changes in sexual behavior. Partly as a 
result of the successful family planning program, many women now expect 
greater intimacy and sexual gratification. As we know, similar processes in the 
West have led to sweeping reforms in marriage and divorce laws and greater 
tolerance for homosexual relationships. In Iran, while the state sometimes backs 
reforms that increase health and education for women, it has adamantly refused 
to budge in its opposition to reforms that curtail men‟s rights to unilateral sexual 
pleasure inside or outside marriage. In response, many young women (and men) 
have delayed marriage and some have refused to marry at all. These shifts in the 
sexual mores of women have led to new anxieties. The rise in premarital sex 
among women and the increase in unhappy marriages, prostitution, and female 
suicide rates have led to public apprehensiveness about the stability of the 
institution of marriage. As in the United States at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, “family values” and “immoral sexual conduct” have become hot-button 
issues that have aided attempts by neoconservatives to hold onto or extend their 
power. 
 
The Green Movement 
On June 15, 2009 some three million people took to the streets of Tehran 
forming a sea of green to protest a stolen presidential election that had 
reinstalled Ahmadinejad and robbed the candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi from 
his victory.  Iranian women were a major presence in this outpouring known as 
the Green Movement. Armed with nothing but green head bands, they stood up 
to the violent Revolutionary Guards and government thugs who smashed the 
protesters with their batons and jailed whomever they caught.  No longer were 
the women an auxiliary branch of some Islamist or leftist male organization 
chanting the men‟s slogans but autonomous individuals, fighting for democracy, 
human rights, and women‟s rights and in the words of the New York Times 
columnist Roger Cohen,  “the vanguard” of the movement. 
Mir-Hossein Mousavi was not a charismatic figure and in the months before the 
election had received little public support.  It was the presence of Mousavi‟s 
wife, Zahra Rahnavard, a former university president, author, and artist that 
gradually energized the public and brought them into the streets in support of 
Mousavi. During a public television debate with Mousavi, Ahmadinejad made 
the mistake of berating Rahnavard and her academic accomplishments.  
Mousavi came to the defense of his wife and through this simple act gained the 
educated and reform-minded public‟s trust. In a matter of days polls began to 
predict a decisive victory for Mousavi.  Soon he and Rahnavard were 
campaigning together, a first in Iranian politics, and reminding the public of 
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their more egalitarian marriage. Mousavi spoke against polygamy and 
Rahnavard campaigned for ratification of the United Nations-sponsored 
Convention for Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). 
Since the brutal crackdown of summer 2009, many leading feminists and 
supporters of the Million Signatures Campaign have been jailed or forced into 
exile.  Many other women-- often sisters, daughters, wives, and mothers of 
reformist figures-- have been detained and/or suffered persecution. But for the 
first time in Iranian history, the public has come to recognize the crucial role of 
women in the struggle for democracy.  Among pious and culturally conservative 
women affiliated with leaders of the Green Movement, a new genre of literature 
has also emerged. Wives are writing open letters to the Supreme Leader and to 
international organizations on behalf of the Green Movement, protesting their 
husbands‟ incarceration but also openly declaring their love for their men.  In a 
culturally conservative society where the religious classes seldom publicly 
pronounce their marital love this is an unprecedented action.  Society is 
changing when veiled women from the formerly Islamist nomenclature 
campaign as companionate compatriots of their husbands and express their 
devotion to human rights and democracy. 
 
 
 
İRAN İSLAM RESPUBLİKASININ GENDER  İQTİSADİYYATI: 
PLANLI UŞAQ DÜNYAYA GƏTİRMƏ, QADININ CİNSİ 
YETİŞKƏNLİK DÖVRÜ, HOMOSEKSUALLARIN HƏYAT TƏRZİ 
 
Janet Afary 
(Kaliforniya Universiteti, Santa Barbara, ABŞ) 
 
 
Məqalədə 17-ci əsrdən başlayaraq,Avropada seksual qadağaların qoyulması,bu qa-
dağaların aradan qaldırılması üçün fəaliyyət göstərən müvafiq cəmiyyətlərin səyləri 
nəticəsində əldə olunan nailiyyətlər, 18-ci əsrin sonlarında gender  nizamlanması ilə 
bağlı  müvafiq hüquqi qaydaların tətbiq olunması, dövlətin hansı hallarda müdaxilə edə 
bilməsi, ailə həyatı qurmaq və doğum üçün qoyulan yaşı həddi və.s haqqında bəhs 
edilir. Dövlətin iqtisadi, hüquqi, tibbi və sağlamlıqla bağlı yürütdüyü siyasətlə əlaqədar 
bu qaydalar dəyişilərək, yenilənir. Nəticədə 20-ci əsrdə Avropada cinsi azadlıq daha 
geniş vüsət almağa başladı. İran İnqilabından sonra  xüsusü ilə 1980-ci illərdə İranda in-
san hüquqlarının kobud şəkildə pozulması,homoseksualların ciddi şəkildə cəzalandırıl-
ması, hətta bir çoxlarının edam olunmaları  ilə bağlı məlumatlar da  məqalədə öz əksini 
tapır. 
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20-ci əsrin ortalarında İran  ilə müqayisədə Amerikada gender bərabərliyi, nizamlanma-
sı, sağlam təməlli ailələrin qurulması, nigahdankənar hamiləliyin qarşısının alınması və 
bu kimi sahələrdə artıq kifayət qədər təcrübəyə malik olmaları, Xristian və Yəhudi ic-
malarının da dini aspektlər baxımdan bu siyasətə necə önəm vermələri xüsusi diqqət 
çəkir.1960-1970-ci illərdə Amerikada boşanmaların qarşısını almaq, qadınlara iqtisadi 
azadlığın verilməsi, gələcək həyat yoldaşı ilə ünsiyyət qurmaq bacarığını artırmaq üçün 
təhsilin nə qədər önəmli olduğunu qeyd edərək, yüksək səviyyədə şəraitlər yaradıldı. 
1980-ci illərdə Amerikada homoseksuallar üçün yeni hüquqlar əldə edildi. Eyni za-
manda nəticə etibarı ilə 21-ci əsrin əvvələrində QİÇS epidemiyasının qarşısının 
alınması ilə bağlı bir çox nailiyyətlər əldə olundu. İranda əsasən Pəhləvilər dövründən 
ancaq valideynlərin icazəsi ilə ailələrin qurulması, təhsilin aşağı səviyyədə olması, 
qadınların hüquqlarının əllərindən alınması, onların cinsi azadlıq hüququndan məhrum 
edilməsi diqqət çəkir. Nəticə etibarı ilə çox qadınlar ailə zorakılığından, rəsmi 
kəbinlərinin olmamasından şikayət edirdilər. Bu çevrilişlər də öz növbəsində əsasən 
seksual adət-ənənələrdə yaranan xoşagəlməzliklərə səbəb olurdu. Məqalədə qadınlar və 
homoseksualların bu sahədə dəyişikliklərin edilməsinin nə qədər çox arzuladıqlarını, 
İran inqilabından bəri gender siyasətində edilən dəyişiklikləri və rollarını necə tədqiq 
etmələri ilə bağlı məlumat verilir. 1990-cı ilin ortalarında ixtisasından asılı olmayaraq, 
İran cəmiyyəti nümayəndələrinin bu dəyişiklikləri etmək üçün göstərdiyi fəaliyyətləri 
haqqında məqalədə geniş bəhs olunub. Gender sistemini liberallaşdırmaqdan ötrü  
edilən cəhdlər nəticəsində qadın nümayəndələrindən ibarət yığıncaqların keçirilməsinə, 
qadınların hüquqlarının qorunması ilə bağlı müvafiq qanun layihələrinin təqdim 
olunmasına, dövlət hesabına qadınların xaricdə təhsil almasına, hicabın nə qədər 
ciddiyət xarakteri daşıdığını nəzərə alaraq, orta məktəb şagirdlərinin geyimlərini daha 
rəngli geyimlər və şərflərlə əvəz edilməsinə nail oldu. Eyni zamanda Birləşmiş millətlər 
təşkilatının, ”Qadınlara qarşı tətbiq olunan bütün zorakılıqların aradan qaldırılması” ilə 
bağlı Konvensiyanın imzalanması ilə bağlı  ölkədaxilində etirazlara səbəb olmasını da 
qeyd etməliyik. Belə ki bu konvensiyanı, “İslama qarşı müharibə elanı” kimi qələmə 
vermələri də məqalədə öz əksini tapmışdır. Gender siyasətinin İranda yeridilməsinin 
qarşısını almaq üçün müvafiq qurumlar əllərindən gələni edirdilər. 2002-ci ildən 
başlayaraq inqilabçılar zəifləməyə başladılar. 2005-ci ildə keçirilən prezident 
seçkilərində qadınların öz hüquqlarını tələb etmələri ilə bağlı hökumətə qarşı çıxmaları, 
göstərdikləri səyləri artıq əvvəlki kimi ciddi rol oynamırdı. Xüsusi ilə 2005-2008-ci 
illərdə nüvə silahı ilə bağlı Qərb ilə İranın üzləşməsində bu səylər getdikcə azalmağa 
başladı, bütün cəhdlərə baxmayaraq inqilabın ilk günlərindəki kimi əldə olunan uğurlu 
nəticələr qədər öz təsirini göstərə bilmədi. Həmçinin məqalədə İran cəmiyyətində cinsi 
oyanma, nikahda olmayanların hüquqların müdafiəsi, planlı uşaq dünyaya gətirılməsi, 
cinsi tərbiyə və təhsili ilə bağlı aparılan araşdırmalar və tədqiqatlarla bağlı məlumatlar 
öz əksini tapır. Məqalədə diqqət çəkən hissə İranda homoseksualların hüquqlarının 
tənzimlənməsi ilə bağlı atılan radikal addımlar, cəmiyyətin cinsi davranışlarda 
dəyişikliklər etməyə can atması, bədbəxt nigahların və qadın intiharlarının artmasının 
qarşısını almaq üçün gostərilən səylər və  maraqlar barədə geniş bəhs edilmişdir. 
 
 
